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Abstract 
In this article, I try to defend the thesis that imagination against reason, moral 
progress through imagination not the reason, solidarity vs. objectivity, the 
emergence of literary culture after philosophical culture from Hegel onwards, 
contingency of language, the usefulness of literature (poetry, novels and stories, 
etc.) in enhancinmg empathy with one another and ultimately reducing 
philosophy to poetry in Richard Rorty's writings point to one thing: the priority 
of literature to philosophy. The literary or post-physical culture that Rorty 
defends is opposed to the Enlightenment and the philosophical and religious 
culture. Rorty prefers literary culture between the religious culture and 
philosophical culture. The literary culture Rorty envisages is a radically historicist 
and nominalist one. Rorty’s romanticised version of pragmatism aims precisely 
at dealing with this literary or post-physical culture or, in generally, the literature.  
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Philosophy makes progress not by 
becoming more rigorous but by 
becoming more imaginative. 
Richard Rorty 
 
Introduction  
 Let us start by examining the relationship between literature and philosophy. 
We see this relationship in the philosophy of some contemporary philosophers 
such as Richard. Rorty places a great deal of value on the critique of philosophy 
and the fundamental concepts of traditional philosophy, and we know that he 
went to Stanford University's Department of Comparative Literature late in his 
academic life. At first step, to considering the issue, it may be useful to point 
out that this relationship has many vicissitudes from the beginning until today. 
The overwhelming relationship between philosophy and literature in the history 
of philosophy from Plato to Rorty, in spite of the complete disregard for this 
relationship in traditional philosophy, is now at the center of the philosophical 
debates of contemporary philosophers. Of course, this relationship is not 
limited to the history of Western philosophy1.  
 The philosophers, the literate or the poets as well as artists have always claimed 
in various ways that their field of activity is a well-deserved field in which truth 
can be discovered. The tool of the philosopher is reason, and the tool of the 
poet of imagination and metaphorical language. In this writing, we will try to 
show that in order to understand the priority of literature to philosophy in 
Richard Rorty,s neo-pragmatism, one must consider some the key words of his 
thought such as, “literary culture versus philosophical culture”, “philosophy as 
a literary genre”, philosophy as poetry, imagination, moral progress through 
imagination, and etc. 
 As Rorty himself has defended the priority of democracy over philosophy in 
“The priority of democracy to philosophy (1992)”, we also advocate the priority 
of literature over philosophy. The priority of freedom over truth is the subject 
of Rorty's book, and the imagination of reason and reason is the subject of our 
article. We believe that if Rorty had written a book or an article on the 
relationship between philosophy and literature at the beginning of the twenty-
first century, surely the title of our article would have been one of his works. 
But he did not write, but the content of such a book or article can be found in 
many of his later works, and we pursue this goal in this article, although we do 
not claim to have been fully successful. 
 
Continental background of Rorty's thought 
 The emergence of the post-structuralist movement and the publication of 
books by postmodern philosophers such as Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and 
Deleuze and the reception of these works at American universities drew the 
attention of analytical and post-philosophical philosophers to these works, and 
generally incorporated European philosophy into American philosophy. 
Nietzsche and Derrida are a familiar model for Rorty's view of philosophy as a 
literary genre. In "Looking Back at a Literary Theory", Rorty says that in the 
1970s, teachers in American literature departments began reading Derrida and 
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Foucault. A new subdiscipline called "literary theory" took shape. The notion 
that a literary text could profitably be "theorized" helped make it easy for 
literature professors to teach their favorite philosophy books and for literature 
students to write their dissertations on philosophical topics. It also helped 
create jobs in literature departments. (Saussy 2006: 63) 
 Since the publication of his famous book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
(1979), Rorty has been influenced by this continental tradition, in particular the 
ideas of French post-structuralist thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, 
Lyotard and others (such as Heidegger). Rorty, in his paper, “Philosophy as a 
Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida”, prefers Derrida to the early Derrida 
because “for Derrida, writing always leads to more writing, and more, and still 
more-just as history does not lead to Absolute Knowledge or the Final Struggle, 
but to more history, and more, and still more”(Rorty 1982: 145). Of course, 
Rorty wants to clear the line between analytic and continental philosophies:  
 
 
I have heard analytic philosophers get furious at comparative 
literature departments for trespassing on philosophical turf by 
teaching Nietzsche and Derrida, and doubly furious at the suggestion 
that they might teach it themselves. Conversely, I have heard fans of 
Continental philosophy be obnoxious about the ‘mere logic-
chopping’ with which their analytic colleagues waste students’ time 
and dehydrate their minds. Like reciprocal charges of incompetence, 
this sort of rhetoric is pointless. It is also dangerous, for it can actually 
result in colleges and universities not having people on the faculty 
who can explain certain books to interested students. Yet the only 
way in which institutions of liberal learning can justify their existence 
is to be places in which students can find practically any book in the 
library – Gadamer or Kripke, Searle or Derrida – and then find 
somebody to talk with about it. When all the jockeying to decide 
which department’s budget will bear the freight is over, we have to 
make sure the result has not been to limit the possibilities open to the 
students (Rorty 1982: 225). 
 
 It should not be forgotten that towards the end of his life he became 
increasingly interested in literature. Richard Rorty was professor emeritus of 
comparative literature and philosophy at Stanford University, passed away on 
Friday, June 8, 2007. 
 
Rorty's pragmatic criticism of philosophy 
Rorty believes that the traditional Western philosophical tradition is a tradition 
on which Plato's heavy shadow has fallen. The Western philosophical tradition 
has always sought to approach the transcendental reality. In the Philosophy and 
mirror of Nature, Rorty characterized the traditional view of philosophy in the 
following way: 
 
Philosophers usually think of their discipline as one which discusses 
perennial, eternal problems – problems which arise as soon as one 
reflects. Some of these concerns the difference between human 
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beings and other beings, and are crystallized in questions concerning 
the relation between the mind and the body. Other problems concern 
the legitimation of claims to know, and are crystallized in questions 
concerning the “foundations” of knowledge. To discover these 
foundations is to discover something about the mind, and conversely. 
Philosophy as a discipline thus sees itself as the attempt to underwrite 
or debunk claims to knowledge made by science, morality, art, or 
religion. It purports to do this on the basis of its special 
understanding of the nature of knowledge and mind. Philosophy can 
be foundational in respect to the rest of culture because culture is an 
assemblage of claims to knowledge, and philosophy adjudicates such 
claims. (Rorty 1979: 3) 
 
 In western tradition, the philosophy’s task or philosopher’s task is to use its 
special methods and tools in order to secure the relationship between the 
mind’s representations and the world represented. On such an approach, 
philosophy is foundational for western culture because it is the tribunal of 
reason before which all other areas of inquiry (namely, other discipilines) are to 
be judged. He believes that philosophy’s remoteness from the rest of culture 
follows from this privileged and special self-understanding. 
 So the phrase has an important message to the reader that Rorty does not 
accept philosophy as a discipline.1 In other words, Rorty’s official position is 
that there is no longer any reason to defend philosophy as an autonomous 
discipline. This American pragmatist philosopher wants to dissolution the 
problems of this philosophy because they are not useful at all. As we have said, 
such a definition of discipline is entirely Plato's definition of philosophy. To 
understand the spirit of Rorty's thought can be considered his endless 
opposition to Platonic thought as the starting point for research on Rorty's 
philosophy. In the Platonic tradition, which is the dominant tradition in the 
West, philosophy has always preceded poetry. 
Ture 
 
Poetry and Philosophy 
 In other words, let me say that the distinction between poetry and philosophy 
and the primacy of philosophy over poetry or the primacy of reason over 
emotion in the Platonic tradition is criticized by Richard Rorty. 
 
I think as soon as you try to re-create the Platonic contrast between 
poetry and philosophy you are in danger of reifying your favorite 
philosopher and calling that philosophy and reifying your favorite 
poet and calling that poetry. Heidegger makes a distinction between 
poets and thinkers that I have never been able to make sense of. I 
don’t know how you are supposed to tell which are which. (Rorty 
2006: 140) 
 
 We all know that poetry is created by the poet's imagination, this great poetry 
of romanticism is a tool for expressing human intentions, and it is a useful tool. 
To claim that literature in general is more useful than philosophy is not to claim 
too much defense. He thinks that literature has more or less supplanted 
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metaphysical sources of moral socialization, But this claim is not justified 
because the situation is different in non-Western cultures. Sometimes literature 
and poetry have been the cause of a nation's backwardness and decline. In Iran, 
for example, the culture of Sufi literature has not allowed rational culture to 
fully grow and has thus brought about social and political repression. Too much 
emphasis on the power of imagination in literature and poetry causes people to 
stay away from criticizing the social and historical situation and the cruelties 
that exist in society. Thus, it seems that Rorty considers the primacy of reason 
only in Western democratic society, not non-Western societies. 
 According to this American philosopher, reason obeys the imagination. This is 
not a disadvantage, but rather a benefit that brings philosophy closer to 
literature and poetry. 
 
In an essay called "Pragmatism and Romanticism" I tried to restate 
the argument of Shelley's "Defense of Poetry." At the heart of 
Romanticism, I said, was the claim that reason can only follow paths 
that the imagination has first broken.2 
 
 In his neo-pragmatism, Rorty strives to give a prominent place to literature and 
literary culture versus the culture of the Enlightenment. Therefore, Rorty says 
that the intellectuals of the West have, since the Renaissance, progressed 
through three stages: they have hoped for redemption first from God, then 
from philosophy, and now from literature. This is Rorty’s thesis and he refers 
to it as Philosophy as a transitional genre: 
 
I can now state my thesis. It is that the intellectuals of the West have, 
since the Renaissance, progressed through three stages: they have 
hoped for redemption first from God, then from philosophy, and 
now from literature. Monotheistic religion offers hope for 
redemption through entering into a new relation to a supremely 
powerful non-human person. Belief in the articles of a creed may be 
only incidental to such a relationship. In philosophy, however, true 
belief is of the essence: redemption by philosophy would consist in 
acquiring a set of beliefs that represent things in the one way they 
truly are. Literature, finally, offers redemption through making the 
acquaintance of as great a variety of human beings as possible. Here 
again, as with religion, true belief may be of little importance (Rorty 
2007:91). 
 
 
 He seems to find true redemption in literature, especially in the books of poets 
and novelists. Of course, he is influenced by Alan Bloom. The term "Self-
creation" in poetry and literature is as important as the truth in philosophy but 
Rorty rejects Philosophy.3 The “Self-creation” demonstrates that we make our 
identity within historical contingencies and social events. Here, he is influenced 
by Nietzsche's thoughts. In other words, Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
critique of epistemology ( namely, perspectivism) to be useful and helpful tool 
in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead 
as something that we create and above all, he also found perspectivism to be a 
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helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. We know that 
this issue allows Rorty to link perspectivism, self-creation, and a clear metaphor, 
literature, together, to interpret the full implications of Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism. Of course, Nietzsche aims to free subject as the heart of 
subjectivism and makes it stop. He delivers subjectivism to perspectivism with 
criticizing solid and a priori categories, and far more important, with disabling 
reason’s ideas that prepare the condition of unconditional knowledge (Arjang 
2019: 25). He uses this to give his model of the pragmatist’s paradigmatic 
human being (Ironist), one who goes about creating oneself constantly instead 
of trying to discover oneself. He argued that we can read philosophers like 
Derrida, Nietzsche, and Heidegger for our own private enjoyment. But, for 
Rorty, though, Nietzsche’s ideas are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of 
the self, that is the job of Freud, and Rorty elaborates on the usefulness and 
applicability of both. Of course, Rorty criticizes Nietzsche for his opposition to 
democracy. 
 Rorty's pragmatic reading of Nietzsche has led to literature. Different works of 
literature will show different sides of the human experience. Thus, one medium 
of literature, poetry, has a greater significance for Rorty. Therefore, at the 
beginning of Chapter two of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity Rorty presents a 
poem by Phillip Larkin as a means of discussing the supremacy of poetry over 
philosophy since Nietzsche’s time. Richard Rorty, in the second chapter of 
Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, called ‘The Contingency of Selfhood’, uses the 
last part of a poem by Philip Larkin (1922-1985), Continuing to Live to clarify his 
ideas about the self. 
 
I think Larkin's poem owes its interest and its strength to this 
reminder of the quarrel between poetry and philosophy, the tension 
between an effort to achieve self-creation by the recognition of 
contingency and an effort to achieve universality by the 
transcendence of contingency. The same tension has pervaded 
philosophy since Hegel's time, and particularly since Nietzsche. The 
important philosophers of our own century are those who have tried 
to follow through on the Romantic poets by breaking with Plato and 
seeing freedom as the recognition of contingency. These are the 
philosophers who try to detach Hegel's insistence on historicity from 
his pantheistic idealism. They accept Nietzsche's identification of the 
strong poet, the maker, as humanity's hero - rather than the scientist, 
who is traditionally pictured as a finder. More generally, they have 
tried to avoid anything that smacks of philosophy as contemplation, 
as the attempt to see life steadily and see it whole, in order to insist on 
the sheer contingency of individual existence (Rorty 1989: 25-26). 
 
 Rorty uses both philosophical thought and poetry of great poets. This is 
Richard Rorty's unique method, and has often been heavily criticized by 
colleagues, friends, and even his students. We see that Rorty moves easily from 
Wittgenstein to Heidegger or from Dewey to Derrida, but he is as apt to draw 
from a Philip Larkin poem, from Proust, or from Nabokov novel as from Kant 
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or Nietzsche. Because, according to him, common message of these thinkers is 
“to insist on the sheer contingency of individual existence” (Rorty 1989: 26). 
In his article, “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida” Rorty 
says that philosophy is not an isolated piece of culture, but it is a kind of literal 
writing or “any literary genre” 
 
All that "philosophy" as a name for a sector of culture means is "talk 
about Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Frege, Russell. . . 
And that lot." Philosophy is best seen as a kind of writing. It is 
delimited, as is any literary genre, not by form or matter, but by 
tradition-a family romance involving, e.g., Father Parmenides, honest 
old Uncle Kant, and bad brother Derrida (Rorty 1978: 143). 
 
 Rorty has identified two types of thinking in philosophy: vertical thinking that 
continues to Kant and horizontal thinking starting from Hegel's phenomenology of 
mind. He holds that later true philosophy is a genre of literature. In the 
following phrase, he describes the characteristics of these two types of 
philosophical thinking: 
 
There, then, are two ways of thinking about various things. I have 
drawn them up as reminders of the differences between a 
philosophical tradition which began, more or less, with Kant, and one 
which began, more or less, with Hegel's Phenomenology. The first 
tradition thinks of truth as a vertical relationship between 
representations and what is represented. The second tradition thinks 
of truth horizontally-as the culminating reinterpretation of our 
predecessors' reinterpretation of their predecessors' reinterpretation. . 
. . This tradition does not ask how representations are related to 
nonrepresentations, but how representations can be seen as hanging 
together (Rorty 1978: 143).  
 
Literary culture and philosophy 
 Rorty wants to show that philosophy since Hegel has sought to use literary and 
poetic language to describe the human condition and its contingency. He in 
“Philosophy as a Transitional Genre”, underlines the significance of Hegel to 
his narrative of emancipation and secularization, so explicitly contends that the 
transition from a philosophy to a literary culture began with this German 
philosopher. It can be said that it was with Hegel that philosophy reached its 
most ambitious and presumptuous form, which almost instantly developed into 
its dialectical opposite; that is, the Hegelian system eventually turned out to be a 
somewhat utterly nonironical self-consuming artifact. Hegel’s system was 
serious in its desire to depict things as they really were and it sought to fit 
everything into a single context. This also signifies, of course, that it pretended 
to represent the totality. Rorty writes: 
 
“Since Hegel’s time, the intellectuals have been losing faith in 
philosophy. This amounts to losing faith in the idea that redemption 
can come in the form of true beliefs. In the literary culture that has 
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been emerging during the last two hundred years, the question ‘Is it 
true?’ has yielded to the question ‘What’s new?’” (Rorty 2004: 9). 
 
 Rorty insists that Hegel transformed philosophy into a literary genre to answer 
the questions of his day. According to him, “From within a literary culture, 
religion and philosophy appear as literary genres. As such, they are optional. 
Just as an intellectual may opt to read many poems but few novels, or many 
novels but few poems, so he or she may read much philosophy, or much 
religious writing, but relatively few poems or novels. The difference between 
the literary intellectuals’ readings of all these books and other readings of them 
is that the inhabitant of a literary culture treats books as human attempts to 
meet human needs, rather than as acknowledgments of the power of a being 
that is what it is apart from any such needs. “God” and “Truth” are, 
respectively, the religious and the philosophical names for that sort of being 
(Rorty 2007:91). The transition from religion to philosophy However, what 
exactly does Rorty mean by the term of literary culture? Let us hear the answer 
from our pragmatist philosopher: 
 
As I am using the terms “literature” and “literary culture,” a culture 
that has substituted literature for both religion and philosophy finds 
redemption neither in a noncognitive relation to a nonhuman person, 
nor in a cognitive relation to propositions, but in noncognitive 
relations to other human beings, relations mediated by human 
artifacts such as books and buildings, paintings and songs. These 
artifacts provide a sense of alternative ways of being human. (Rorty 
2004: 10) 
 
 He believes that philosophy seeks something deep within the human and that 
it’s similar to the concept of God that religion seeks as its ultimate goal. But on 
the contrary, the literature tells us that human has nothing deep within himself 
and that with the power of imagination, man has come up with such concepts. 
For this reason he even seeks moral progress in literature, not philosophy. 
In sum, Rorty maintains what philosophy could do is nothing but to inspire 
imagination and so advocates a so-called post-philosophical culture, which 
emphasizes real cultural and political life over pure contemplation. In this way, 
Rorty tries to overcome dominating ideas such as Idea, logos, the Absolute, 
essence, reality, and categorical imperative, as well as the binary oppositions 
including that between reality and appearance, which in Western metaphysics 
have reigned ever since the time of the Greeks. Post-philosophical culture is 
just a culture that has discarded these traditional philosophical ideas (Derong & 
Liangjian 2005: 633-4). 
 Rorty believes that moral progress depends on the development of imagination 
and the promotion of emotion among people. Poets outnumber philosophers 
in developing this imagination and in promoting sentiment among the people. 
It can be said that literature that opens the moral imagination, thus providing a 
possibility of greater sensitivity and sympathy for the suffering of other peoples 
in world, constitutes what Rorty at times refers to as a sentimental literature 
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that facilitates sentimental education. Sentiment for him appears to be a subtle 
combination of feelings and impressions that provide a basis for judgment and 
action in his neopragmatism. The question may come to mind of readers if 
Rorty is a romantic thinker. The answer is no, because he has not even written a 
single page of poetry. He is a literary pragmatist whose pragmatism is literary in 
color. 
Thus, Sentiment and imagination in moral progress are two interrelated 
concepts that Rorty has included in his view of moral philosophy. Hart says 
that “n sum for Rorty there exists a line of evolution from opening the moral 
imagination, to enhanced sympathy-empathy, to cultivating proper moral 
sentiments, to expanded loyalty and the pursuit of a greater justice. What he 
calls “inspirational literature” and “inspired reading” can uniquely and 
powerfully merge in this development. When Rorty attributes inspirational 
value to works of literature, he means that such works “make people think 
there is more to this life than they ever imagined”(Hart 2011: 40). So “his point 
is that moral progress is not a matter of an increase in rationality, nor does it 
involve developing what Dewey called intelligence”(Asghari 2015:69-70), 
Rather, it aims to improve the lives of individuals in a democratic society.  
 Let's go back to the differences between philosophy and literature. Finding the 
truth in the human mind and making the truth in the human mind is something 
that is understandable from Rorty's words. I think that this is the fundamental 
difference between philosophy and literature in Rorty’s mind. Of course, we 
have to admit that his contemporaries have always criticized Rorty’s conception 
of philosophy and we do not intend to go into more detail. However, in the 
struggle between philosophy and literature Rorty advocates literature. Rorty 
writes about this struggle: 
 
Kierkegaard rightly said that philosophy began to set itself up as a 
rival to religion when Socrates suggested that our self-knowledge was 
knowledge of God – that we had no need of help from a non-human 
person, because the truth was already within us. But literature began 
to set itself up as a rival to philosophy when people like Cervantes 
and Shakespeare began to suspect that human beings were, and ought 
to be, so diverse that there is no point in pretending that they all carry 
a single truth deep in their bosoms (Rorty 2007: 93). 
 
 Like Kierkegaard, he seeks to replace literature with philosophy, as Socrates 
replaced philosophy with religion. Here we find that Rorty finds it useful in the 
Western philosophical tradition to transition from religion to philosophy, from 
philosophy to literature. He analyzes the usefulness of this transition and 
transformation both from the perspective of American pragmatism and from 
the perspective of post-structuralist thought such as Derrida and Foucault. This 
philosophy is not about proving the essence of things. There is no doubt that 
Derrida is as much involved in Rorty's thinking as Wittgenstein. So he, under 
the influence of Derrida and his deconstruction, believes that philosophy is not 
only pure knowledge, but it is a kind of philosophy of language whose task is 
no longer to represent the essence of things in the world but self-creation 
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through literary language and poetic imagination. For this reason, Rorty uses 
literature, and especially poets, to describe and defend such a philosophy. We 
know that language and the philosophy of language in Derrida's post-
structuralist thought greatly influenced the Rorty's thought formation. In order 
to understand the nature of literary culture, one must first turn to language. 
 
Contingency of Language 
 Let us focus here on the question of language as the common focus of 
philosophy and literature in modern times on Rorty's thought. Rorty writes in 
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity that“If we cease to attempt to make sense of the 
idea of such a nonhuman language, we shall not be tempted to confuse the 
platitude that the world may cause us to be justified in believing a sentence true 
with the claim that the world splits itself up, on its own initiative, into sentence-
shaped chunks called "facts." (Rorty 1989: 5). 
 Two points can be deduced from this statement: First, language is not a fixed 
nature and second, the reality is made by language. In other words, Language 
has no fixed essence. Susan Haack points the contingency of language as the 
conventionality of justification in Rorty: “by the time of Contingency, Irony 
and Solidarity, Rorty has a different defensive strategy: he describes those who, 
like himself, have grasped the 'contingency' of language, the conventionality of 
justification, as 'ironists' (Haack 1993:193) 
 Language has its own contingency, and this is essential to understanding a 
literary culture. According to him, language plays an important role in literary 
culture. Of course, In order to understand Rorty’s narrative on the rise of 
literary culture, one has to consider the role that this idea plays in Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity. At the beginning of the first chapter (“The Contingency of 
Language”), Rorty advances the argument that what unites the German 
idealists, the French revolutionaries, and the Romantic poets is that they 
understood, at the end of the eighteenth century, “that anything could be made 
to look good or bad, important or unimportant, useful or useless, by being 
redescribed” (Rorty 1989: 7). In addition, what the German idealists, the 
utopian revolutionaries, and the Romantic poets had in common was “a dim 
sense that human beings whose language changed so that they no longer spoke 
of themselves as responsible to nonhuman powers would thereby become a 
new kind of human beings” (Rorty 1989: 7). This contingency is a question of 
his historicism. According to Robert Brandom, the strong conclusion Rorty 
draws from his conception of the contingency of language is that “No area of 
culture, and no period of history, gets Reality more right than any other. The 
difference between the areas and epochs is their relative efficiency in 
accomplishing various purposes. There is no such thing as Reality to be gotten 
right – only snow, fog, Olympian deities, relative aesthetic worth, the 
elementary particles, human rights, the divine right of kings, the Trinity, and the 
like” (Brandom 2000 :375).  
In Rorty's philosophy there is a kind of sanctification of Romanticism, in 
contrast to a hatred of the Enlightenment and its theoretical aspirations 
throughout his writings. Rorty is not a poet and has not written a book of 
poetry or a book on Romanticism but finds it useful for human self-creation. 
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That is why he has been greatly influenced by Bloom. Broadly characterised, the 
sort of romanticism that Rorty prefers is the independent, muscular variety 
celebrated by his literary mentor, Harold Bloom. Throughout his career, Rorty 
embraced a number of ideas and attitudes associated with Bloom’s picture of 
the romantic poet as engaged in a dialectical struggle for articulacy and 
autonomy.Rorty’s romantic watchwords, accordingly, are imagination, 
spontaneity, freedom, contingency, plurality, power, and creativity – ideas that 
he pits against notions such as reason, receptivity, truth, necessity, 
commensurability, knowledge, and harmony. Most important, perhaps, is the 
notion of truth as created rather than discovered, enabled by the romantic 
inversion of the values assigned by Kant to the determinative and the reflective 
judgement in the third Critique (Milnes 2011:24) 
 
Conclusion 
 It is crucial to note that Richard Rorty, emphasizing on literary culture against 
enlightenment philosophy, seems to hold that only in his ideal poetized culture 
would one archive full human dignity and maturity because we can reach the 
best human solidarity and consensus in this culture. According to him, human 
solidarity and consensus is the main goal of democratic society. A culture that 
matures to the point of finally giving up on realism would, he thinks, realise 
that ‘what matters is our loyalty to other human beings clinging together against 
the dark, not our hope of getting things right’ (Rorty 1982: 166). In such a 
culture, the authority of non-human objectivity would be replaced by human 
solidarity, and forms of description would not be ranked according to their 
supposed ability to correspond to the true nature of reality, only according to 
their usefulness, something which varies from context to context.4 
 Three aspects are important here. First, Rorty presents himself as a pragmatist 
philosopher who is interestingly attracted to the usefulness of theories, 
especially, in action and, generally, in human society. Second, he wants to 
replace philosophical discourse with literary one in his American culture and for 
doing so, he uses postmodern philosophies such as deconstruction or 
Levinasian ethics. Three, he, in the final chapter of Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature, holds that “redescription ourselves is the most things we can do “(Rorty 
1979: 358-9) this is the best literature can do, not philosophy or science. In 
general, Rorty tells us a story in which one thing replaces one another and finds 
this replacement useful from a pragmatic perspective. For example, according 
to him, Kantian philosophy replaces Hegelian historical philosophy, 
Romanticism replaces pragmatism, and eventually philosophy replaces 
literature. 
 We see that Rorty in later works such as Philosophy as Cultural Politics redefines 
philosophy as culture criticism or cultural politics. In addition, I think that this 
desire in his mind roots in early works, but we do not want to consider this 
issue here because it requires another article. So we can say that imagination 
against reason, moral progress through imagination, not the reason, solidarity 
vs. objectivity, the emergence of literary culture after philosophical culture from 
Hegel onwards, contingency of language, the usefulness of literature (poetry, 
novels and stories, etc.) in enhancing empathy with one another and ultimately 
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reducing philosophy to poetry in Richard Rorty's writings point to one thing: 
the priority of literature to philosophy.If there is one philosopher among 
contemporary pragmatist philosophers whose literature is at the heart of his 
thought, he is Rorty. In other words, he is the pragmatist philosopher of 
literature, even if he himself would reject that label absolutely.  
 
Notes 
1.  But in the Muslim world, Islamic philosophers have always sought to blend 
literary language with philosophical language. Ibn Sina, for example, sometimes 
uses literary language in his books to express his rational thought and also it is 
sometimes seen that a philosopher like Suhrawardi uses a literary story to 
explain his philosophical perspective. But here our goal is not to get into the 
details. 
2.   See “The Fire of Life” by Richard Rorty at 
      https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poetrymagazine/articles/68949/the-fire-of-
lifeRorty  
3.  Rorty has expressed the hope that his brand of ‘antiphilosophy’ might lead  
to a ‘post-Philosophical culture’ (Rorty 1982: xl). This sounds like a call to bring 
philosophy to an end once and for all. See Tartaglia, James (2007) Rorty and the 
Mirror of Nature, Routledge 
4.  Rorty has expressed the hope that his brand of ‘antiphilosophy’ might lead  
to a ‘post-Philosophical culture’ (Rorty 1982: xl). This sounds like a call to bring 
philosophy to an end once and for all. See Tartaglia, James (2007) Rorty and the 
Mirror of Nature, Routledge 
 
References  
 Arjang, Aminallah (2019)”The Decline of Subjectivism and Emergence of 
Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Thought”, The Quarterly Journal of Philosophical 
Investigations (University of Tabriz)Volume 13, Issue 27, Summer 2019, Page 23-49 
 Asghari, Muhammad (2015)”Has Richard Rorty a moral philosophy?” in journal 
of Philosophical Investigations (university of Tabriz), Fall & Winter 2015/ Vol. 9/ 
No. 17, pp. 55-74 
 Derong, Pan & Liangjian, Liu (2005) “Contingency And The Philosophy Of 
Richard Rorty” in Journal of Chinese Philosophy 32:4 (December 2005)pp. 633–640 
 Guignon, Charles & Hiley, David R. (edi) (2003) Richard Rorty, Cambridge 
University Press 
 Haack, Susan (1993) Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, 
Blackwell Publishers 
 Hart, Richard E. (2011) “Richard Rorty on literature and moral progress” 
journal of Pragmatism Today, Vol. 2/ Issue. 2/ Winter 2011, pp.34-64  
 Milnes, Tim (2011) “Rorty, Romanticism and The Literary Absolute”, in journal 
of Pragmatism Today, Vol. 2/ Issue. 2/ Winter 2011, pp. 24-34 
 Robert B. Brandom, Ed., Rorty and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. 
 Rorty, Richard & Mendieta, Eduardo  (2006) Take Care of Freedom and Truth Will 
Take Care of Itself: Interviews with Richard Rorty, Richard Rorty, Edited and with an 
Introduction by Eduardo Mendieta, Stanford University Press 
 Rorty, Richard (1978)”Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida” 
in New Literary History, Vol. 10, No. 1, Literary Hermeneutics. (autumn, 1978), pp. 
141-160. 
 The Priority of literature to Philosophy in Richard Rorty /219  
 
 
 Rorty, Richard (1989) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 Rorty, Richard (2004). “Philosophy as a Transitional Genre.” Pragmatism, 
Critique,Judgment: Essays for Richard J. Bernstein, ed. Seyla Benhabib and Nancy 
Fraser. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3–28. 
 Rorty, Richard (2006)"Looking Back at a Literary Theory" In Comparative 
Literature in an Age of Globalization, Edited by Haun Saussy, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
 Rorty, Richard (2007) Philosophy as cultural politics: philosophical papers, volume 4, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 Rorty, Richard. (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 Tartaglia, James (2007) Rorty and the Mirror of Nature, Routledge. 
